



Observatoire ARGA

Report on Sanctions and Compliance for 2025

INTERPOL as a Field of Geopolitics

International Abuses, Influence Structures, and the Transformation of Control in the Era of the Sanctions Ecosystem 3.0

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Executive Summary

INTERPOL, originally created as a neutral coordination mechanism for law-enforcement agencies, is rapidly transforming into one of the key architectures of global politics and a strategic instrument of international pressure. In the era of the Sanctions Ecosystem 3.0—where financial, technological, legal and diplomatic tools merge into a unified risk-governance structure—INTERPOL no longer performs exclusively police functions. It has become part of the strategic toolkit of states competing for influence, security, and control over cross-border flows of people, capital and information.

ARGA Observatory records an unprecedented rise in abuses of INTERPOL channels, especially by authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Notices and diffusions are increasingly used to pursue goals unrelated to criminal prosecution: exerting pressure on businesses, suppressing political activity, restricting media, and influencing corporate conflicts and transnational economic disputes.

INTERPOL is turning into an arena where competing models of law and order collide: democratic systems insisting on human-rights primacy, and repressive regimes using international mechanisms to target opponents. The geopoliticisation of INTERPOL is not an abstract dynamic but a set of concrete actions visible in hundreds of cases where international search mechanisms become tools of political revenge, corporate raiding and financial isolation.

Against the backdrop of an intensifying sanctions architecture, the AML/KYC + INTERPOL nexus is growing stronger: Red Notices and diffusions are increasingly accompanied by, or preceded by, financial restrictions, freeze measures in banks in the EU, UK, UAE and Switzerland, and dissemination of incomplete or distorted data through FIUs. Authoritarian governments have learned to use sanctions rhetoric—accusations of “financing extremism,” “foreign influence,” “illegal schemes”—as a veil for politically motivated cases. As a result, banks and fintech platforms perceive such signals as high-risk markers, automatically restricting financial mobility.

This dynamic is reinforced by the geopolitical contest for influence within international organisations. States with highly politicised law-enforcement systems actively cultivate lobbying networks inside INTERPOL, influencing appointments, voting blocs, and decision-making. This transforms the organisation into a field of complex diplomatic configurations, where every notice, suspension or recommendation can carry strategic consequences.

ARGA Observatory shows that financial institutions are also under pressure. Banks, fearing secondary sanctions and reputational damage, increasingly treat notices and diffusions as indicators of high risk. This leads to asset freezes, account closures and service refusals—even in the absence of evidence or where political motives are evident. INTERPOL is effectively becoming part of the global financial-control infrastructure.

This creates a paradox: a system designed to protect public order is increasingly used in violation of human rights, forming an “extraterritorial extension” of domestic repression. Individuals fleeing threats at home find themselves trapped in transnational persecution, where governments try to use INTERPOL as a tool of return, coercion or economic isolation.

ARGA Observatory therefore proposes to view INTERPOL not only as an institution of international criminal cooperation, but as a component of the global political-economic architecture. In the era of the Sanctions Ecosystem 3.0, international legal, financial and police

mechanisms have become arenas of strategic rivalry and channels via which domestic conflicts spill across borders.

This report provides an analytical foundation for understanding how INTERPOL is being reshaped by sanctions, financial policy, corporate interests and geopolitical competition—and why safeguarding its neutrality has become one of the central challenges for international security.

Methodology

The methodology of this study is based on a combination of legal, political, financial, and compliance analysis, allowing INTERPOL to be examined simultaneously as an institution of international legal order and as a sphere of geopolitical influence. The report applies a multilayered approach that integrates normative review, empirical case analysis, examination of decision-making mechanisms, and assessment of the political context of requesting states.

1. Analysis of CCF decisions and practices (Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files)

Special attention is given to CCF decisions concerning citizens of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and other states, which demonstrate systemic deviations from Article 3 of INTERPOL's Constitution and human-rights standards. The analysis includes:

- examination of CCF reasoning and legal conclusions,
- references to the political nature of cases,
- assessment of the application of due-process standards.

2. Assessment of compliance of notices and diffusions with RPD (INTERPOL Rules on the Processing of Data)

The study evaluates whether international alerts comply with:

- admissibility criteria,
- predicate-offence requirements,
- standards of proportionality and verifiability,
- restrictions related to political, military, religious, or racial grounds.

The review includes reconstruction of the timing of the request, the quality of its justification, the level of supporting evidence, and the presence of political context.

3. Examination of complaints and submissions by human-rights organisations, lawyers and legal representatives

The empirical basis includes CCF complaints, legal submissions, public statements and memoranda addressed to INTERPOL, as well as reports of NGOs (Fair Trials, HRW, Amnesty). These materials were used to identify typologies of abuse and recurring patterns of political pressure.

4. Comparative review of cases from 2018–2025

A comparative analysis was carried out on several hundred ARGAs Observatory cases (public and NDA), including those involving entrepreneurs, political figures, journalists, opposition activists and subjects of corporate disputes. Recurrent schemes were identified:

- parallel use of INTERPOL and AML mechanisms,
- substitution of political charges with economic ones,
- corporate attacks via international alerts.

5. Use of data from international courts (ECtHR, EU Court of Justice, national supreme courts)

Judicial precedents were analysed in which coercive measures, including INTERPOL-related actions, were found to violate:

- Article 6 ECHR (right to a fair trial),
- Article 3 of INTERPOL’s Constitution,
- international refugee-protection standards,
- principles prohibiting political persecution.

These precedents informed the legal criteria for identifying abuses.

6. Analysis of political and corporate dynamics in the CIS, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe

Political-context assessment included:

- analysis of power structures,
- decision-making models of law-enforcement bodies,
- links between security elites and corporate groups,
- use of criminal law as a tool of pressure,
- involvement of FIUs, tax authorities and security agencies.

Political dynamics were then compared with the nature of international notices.

7. Internal analytical observations of ARGAs Observatory

Confidential data were used regarding:

- the structure of international alerts,
- profiles of targeted individuals,

- pressure mechanisms,
- INTERPOL’s interaction with financial institutions.

Based on this body of observations, ARGA Observatory developed models of:

- politically motivated notices,
- corporate abuse via INTERPOL,
- combined AML + INTERPOL pressure,
- transnational isolation of individuals.

Introduction: INTERPOL in the New Global Architecture

1. Politicisation of the International Legal Order

In recent years, INTERPOL has increasingly been drawn into political and corporate processes that go far beyond its original mandate. The rise of authoritarian practices, the strengthening of security-sector control over the economy, and the proliferation of corporate conflicts have led to a situation in which international notices are used not only to combat crime, but also as a tool for:

- exerting pressure on political opponents and journalists,
- influencing corporate disputes and conflicts over ownership,
- persecuting entrepreneurs who have left their home countries,
- restricting the mobility of economic and civic actors.

Thus, INTERPOL mechanisms have become part of both foreign- and domestic-policy toolkits of various states, while the notices themselves produce long-term harm to targeted individuals (asset freezes, KYC refusals, travel restrictions).

2. INTERPOL as an Element of the Sanctions Ecosystem

In parallel, sanctions regimes are shaping a new global architecture of control. Against this backdrop, INTERPOL requests are increasingly being used as an additional channel of pressure and a “multiplier” of sanctions-related restrictions.

Key trends include:

- criminal cases are framed to disguise political or sanctions-related motives, enabling states to submit INTERPOL requests under the guise of economic offences;
- financial and compliance institutions treat INTERPOL notices as sanctions signals, automatically intensifying monitoring and freezing of assets;
- a growing INTERPOL + AML nexus, where international alerts are used in parallel with bank account freezes;

— corporate groups leverage INTERPOL in cross-border disputes, exerting pressure on opponents through international mechanisms.

In this sense, INTERPOL becomes functionally embedded in the sanctions ecosystem and operates as part of a multilayered system of transnational control, even though it is not formally a sanctions institution.

Typologies of Abuse

ARGA Observatory identifies six systemic models that constitute the contemporary architecture of INTERPOL abuse. Each model already demonstrates stable recurrence and clear transnational effects.

1. Politically Motivated Prosecutions

States use INTERPOL mechanisms to export domestic repression beyond their borders. Criminal cases are launched against opposition figures, journalists, human-rights defenders, entrepreneurs, and former officials — transforming international notices into tools for:

- controlling movement outside the country,
- exerting pressure on individuals in exile,
- international discreditation,
- blocking access to accounts and assets.

In practice, INTERPOL Red/Blue/Diffusion Notices become extensions of political coercion, disguised as criminal-law processes.

2. Corporate Wars and Raiding via INTERPOL

INTERPOL mechanisms are deployed as tools of economic pressure within corporate conflicts. This includes:

- initiating criminal cases at the request of competing business groups,
- coercing individuals into transferring assets or shutting down projects,
- blocking travel or enabling arrests to create leverage during negotiations.

In some jurisdictions, INTERPOL abuse has become a standard element of corporate raiding schemes, where criminal prosecution and international alerts function as components of a unified coercive strategy.

3. Intersection with Sanctions Mechanisms

The Sanctions Ecosystem 3.0 creates a new zone of overlap between sanctions and INTERPOL. Emerging patterns include cases where:

- sanctions status is invoked as part of the justification for INTERPOL requests;

- individuals involved in sanctions-sensitive transactions become targets of international alerts;
- criminal charges are used to disguise sanctions-related motives and to legitimise coercive actions.

As a result, INTERPOL abuse becomes part of a hybrid system of control, while international banks begin to treat INTERPOL notices as sanctions triggers.

4. Use of INTERPOL to Discipline Domestic Elites

Criminal proceedings are used not only as tools of external pressure but also as mechanisms of internal discipline within elite groups. Through INTERPOL requests, states:

- deter officials and business elites from political disloyalty;
- eliminate competing clans and rival power groups;
- control major assets and financial flows held abroad.

INTERPOL thus becomes an instrument for enforcing elite loyalty and maintaining the internal balance of coercive power.

5. Financial and Economic Coercion

This is the most widespread typology of abuse. Economic and tax-related charges provide a convenient legal façade for cross-border pressure. Common practices include:

- fabrication of financial evidence;
- initiation of cases without damage or expert assessments;
- parallel requests to foreign banks (freeze + INTERPOL);
- cross-border attempts to control private and corporate assets.

In such schemes, INTERPOL functions as the “long arm” of financial persecution.

6. Transnational Political Coordination

States linked by political, economic, or security alliances increasingly coordinate their use of INTERPOL as an instrument of repression:

- exchanging “services” in persecuting opponents;
- mutually executing each other’s requests while ignoring the risk of political motivation;
- synchronising criminal cases across multiple jurisdictions.

This produces a new configuration of international legal order in which INTERPOL mechanisms are used to advance coalition interests rather than global justice.

Regional Map of Abuses

The regional dynamics of INTERPOL-abuse demonstrate clear geopolitical patterns. Misuse is concentrated in clusters of states where high coercive control intersects with low judicial independence. ARGA Observatory identifies four key regional blocs.

1. Russia and the CIS

This is the largest source of politically motivated requests and systemic abuses. Key characteristics include:

- extensive use of *in absentia* arrest warrants as the formal basis for Red Notices;
- widespread reliance on Articles 159, 160, 199, 210 of the Russian Criminal Code to conceal political or corporate motives;
- fabrication of economic predicates in corporate conflicts, especially in disputes over ownership and asset control;
- use of INTERPOL to pressure business elites, migrants, journalists, and former officials;
- integration with AML mechanisms: freeze measures + INTERPOL requests.

Russia generates the largest corpus of transnational cases, significantly influencing international banking and migration systems.

2. Kazakhstan and Central Asia

The region exhibits a stable pattern of using INTERPOL as a tool of politico-economic control. Characteristic features:

- criminal cases against former high-ranking officials and executives of state-owned enterprises;
- clan-based and regional conflicts leading to international wanted notices;
- attempts to recover assets moved abroad via Red Notices and Diffusions;
- cross-border pressure on businesses through requests to the UAE, Turkey, the EU, and the UK;
- overlap between corporate disputes and political prosecutions.

In this region, INTERPOL-abuse is often deployed to regulate access to major resources: mineral deposits, land assets, and infrastructure projects.

3. The Caucasus

Abuses cluster around political competition and elite conflicts. Main manifestations:

- cases against opposition politicians, journalists, and civil activists;

- use of criminal prosecution as an extension of domestic political struggle;
- export of pressure onto opponents living in exile;
- intra-elite and intra-clan conflicts reframed as criminal investigations.

The Caucasus is characterised by a fusion of political competition and battles for economic influence and resource control.

4. Eastern Europe

Several states in the region demonstrate emerging patterns of using INTERPOL within political and economic strategies. Observed trends include:

- attempts to exert political pressure via international alerts;
- criminal cases used to control entrepreneurs with foreign-based assets;
- corporate persecutions with cross-border implications;
- internal political conflicts escalating into international requests.

Although the scale is smaller than in the CIS, the trend persists and intensifies during periods of political turbulence.

Practical Examples

Case 1 — In Absentia Arrest + International Wanted Notice + Corporate Conflict

The scenario begins with the initiation of a criminal case on economic grounds (Articles 159, 160, 210, 199 of the Russian Criminal Code, or analogous provisions in other CIS jurisdictions). The *in absentia* arrest measure is used as a formal basis for submitting a Red Notice, despite the absence of a genuine investigation or evidentiary foundation.

The Red Notice becomes a tool of pressure within a corporate conflict:

- creating the threat of arrest abroad;
- prompting banks to impose freezes upon receiving an INTERPOL signal;
- causing business partners to terminate contracts;
- reducing the market value of the target's assets.

In this way, INTERPOL becomes an element of a broader raider strategy, enabling law-enforcement and corporate actors to achieve their objectives without overt asset seizure.

Case 2 — Political Prosecution of a Former Official

This case type is characteristic of states with fragmented or competing elite structures. After an official leaves office, criminal cases are launched on corruption-related or economic charges.

The typical scheme includes:

- constructing a criminal predicate without financial expertise or substantiated damage;
- initiating an international wanted notice under the pretext of anti-corruption enforcement;
- running a parallel media campaign through state-controlled outlets;
- using INTERPOL as a channel of pressure to force the individual’s return or to neutralise their political activities abroad.

Attempts at extradition are often accompanied by coercive measures directed at family members, business partners, and overseas assets.

Case 3 — Transnational Economic Scheme

This scenario spans several states and is based on coordinated actions by security and enforcement structures involved in the redistribution of economic influence.

A typical construction includes:

- initiating a criminal case in one country, followed by the “export” of that information to neighbouring jurisdictions;
- using INTERPOL mechanisms to monitor the target’s movements along capital-transit routes;
- synchronising asset freeze requests, banking inquiries, and international alerts across multiple states;
- attempting to fabricate an artificial “international trail” to amplify pressure on a businessperson or investor.

These cases illustrate the use of INTERPOL as part of a cross-border financial control infrastructure within inter-state conflicts and economic power struggles.

Legal Assessment: Non-Compliance with the RPD Rules

The practice of Interpol-abuse systematically contradicts several provisions of the INTERPOL Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD). Analysis of ARGV Observatory case files identifies four main clusters of violations.

1. Violation of Article 2 RPD — Principle of Neutrality

Article 2 requires Interpol to remain neutral in political, military, religious, and racial matters.

However, in countries with highly politicised law-enforcement systems, requests are frequently linked to:

- the political activities of the individual;
- participation in protests or civic initiatives;
- conflicts between competing elite groups;
- domestic political processes.

Neutrality is breached when a criminal case functions as an instrument of political control.

2. Violation of Article 3 RPD — Prohibition of Politically Motivated Prosecutions

Article 3 explicitly forbids the use of Interpol for political purposes.

Nevertheless, common abuse patterns include:

- combining political motives with economic charges (e.g., “fraud”, “tax evasion”, “corruption”);
- prosecuting opposition politicians, journalists, and activists;
- disguising political accusations through neutral legal formulations;
- seeking extradition despite factual inconsistencies or lack of evidence.

The systemic indicator: a criminal predicate is used to conceal an overtly political purpose.

3. Violation of Articles 82–87 RPD — Evidentiary Quality Requirements

These provisions set standards for the sufficiency, reliability, and verifiability of data submitted to Interpol.

Typical violations include:

- absence of substantive evidence, or purely nominal materials;
- reliance on operational notes without expert assessments;
- no court decisions or proof of damages;
- fabricated or incomplete documents;
- failure to disclose the procedural stage of the case.

In many instances, the CCF later concludes that such requests are unfounded.

4. Violation of Article 30 RPD — Right to a Fair Trial

Article 30 requires evaluation of whether procedural guarantees in the requesting state are respected.

However, numerous cases demonstrate:

- *in absentia* proceedings without genuine notification;
- denial of access to case materials;
- unreasonable delays and procedural violations;
- lack of an independent judiciary;
- charges based on undisclosed or classified materials.

In such contexts, the requests fail to meet the criteria of due process and are therefore incompatible with Interpol's mandate.

Institutional Risks Facing Interpol

The current dynamics of abuse of international notice mechanisms create a set of systemic threats for Interpol, already affecting the organisation's effectiveness and legitimacy.

Overload of the CCF (Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files)

The number of complaints regarding politically motivated notices is increasing every year, resulting in:

- extended processing times (in certain cases up to 12–18 months);
- structural overload of the Commission's Secretariat;
- limited capacity to conduct in-depth analysis of each case;
- a growing number of temporary suspensions of notices.

In its current configuration, the CCF operates at the limit of its institutional capacity.

Growing Political Pressure on the General Secretariat

States with authoritarian political systems actively use diplomatic channels to:

- secure the retention of notices already issued;
- obstruct the deletion of Red Notices;
- legitimise questionable requests through “anti-corruption” or “economic crime” rhetoric.

This creates the risk of internal politicisation within the organisation and undermines Interpol's principle of neutrality.

Risk of Losing Trust Among Western Regulators

The EU, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada increasingly view politicised requests as a threat to:

- human rights;
- international financial order;
- the security of banking transactions.

There are already precedents where financial regulators effectively ignore Interpol notices, considering them potentially unreliable. This presents a direct challenge to Interpol's institutional standing.

Narrowing Space for International Cooperation

The rise of Interpol-abuse results in:

- some countries limiting their data exchange;
- democratic states strengthening their filtering of incoming requests;
- erosion of trust in certain channels (including Diffusions);
- decreasing levels of mutual recognition of data.

Interpol risks transforming from an instrument of global cooperation into a fragmented network where trust exists only between “compatible” states.

Use of International Notices for Economic Gain

In several countries, Interpol notices have become part of schemes involving:

- corporate pressure;
- cross-border raiding and asset seizures;
- redistribution of property;
- control over the assets of political and business elites.

Such practices undermine the rule of law and turn international notices into tools of economic competition, directly threatening the organisation's mandate.

Forecast 2025–2027

1. Growth of Interpol Abuse by Authoritarian States

In the coming years, the number of politically motivated requests from states with strong security-sector centralisation is expected to continue rising.

Primary targets will include entrepreneurs, former officials, journalists, and members of the elite who have left their home countries.

Interpol will increasingly be used as a tool of transnational coercion and a mechanism for controlling mobile capital abroad.

2. Strengthening of the CCF and a Shift Toward Expanded Evidence Review

The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files will become one of the key global filters in data security and human-rights protection.

Expected developments:

- increase in the number of requests to delete notices;
- tightening of evidentiary standards;
- expanded assessment of predicates and political context;
- greater transparency of decisions.

The CCF is effectively becoming a “*supreme court*” for politically motivated cases.

3. Integration of Sanctions, AML, and Interpol Mechanisms

A unified architecture of global control is emerging: sanctions lists, AML signals, and Interpol Notices begin to reinforce each other.

Implications include:

- increased automatic freeze-actions triggered by the presence of an Interpol notice;
- integration of FIU, banking, and law-enforcement data streams;
- emergence of new hybrid risk categories (e.g., PMAF/PMFI + Interpol).

This integrated framework will become one of the central tools of international regulatory governance.

4. Stricter Approach by the EU and the United States Toward Requests from Third Countries

The European Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada will tighten their filtering standards for incoming Interpol requests:

- requirement to provide a complete evidentiary package;
- review of potential political motives;
- refusal to act on requests lacking a legitimate legal predicate or showing signs of fabrication;
- more frequent disregard of Diffusion Notices.

This will lead to the emergence of a two-tier trust system: “safe jurisdictions” and “high-risk jurisdictions.”

5. Formation of a Global “Blacklist” of Jurisdictions that Abuse Interpol

Under pressure from Western regulators, analytical centres, and international courts, a non-formal and later partially institutionalised list of countries systematically violating RPD rules is expected to develop.

Consequences:

- higher probability of automatic rejection of their requests;
- reduced trust in FIU and investigative data from these jurisdictions;
- stricter KYC/EDD requirements for their citizens and corporate entities;
- strengthening of international monitoring mechanisms.

This process will become part of a broader transformation of the global law-enforcement architecture.

ARGA Observatory Recommendations

For INTERPOL and the CCF

- **Strengthen multi-layered assessment of political and economic motives:** introduce mandatory analysis of political context, corporate disputes, sanctions environment, and potential signs of pressure from security agencies. This should include evaluation of the legal predicate, sources of evidence, and the likelihood of fabrication.
- **Implement a Risk-Based Jurisdiction Assessment:** identify categories of states that systematically violate the RPD (Articles 2, 3, 30, 82–87) and apply enhanced evidentiary requirements and higher verification standards to them. This mechanism would serve as an analogue of AML-style Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) for international notices.

- **Expand independent auditing of requests and metadata:** establish an external expert panel (international lawyers, human-rights experts, former judges and prosecutors) to review samples of cases, ensuring transparency and preventing abuse.
- **Increase transparency of CCF decisions,** including the publication of consolidated reports on violation typologies, abuse patterns, and jurisdictions with elevated activity.
- **Create an integrated protection mechanism for victims of Interpol Abuse,** including accelerated notice deletion procedures, temporary “freezes” on enforcement of questionable requests, and international guarantees of access to legal protection.

For International Organisations (OECD, EU, UNODC)

- **Integrate monitoring of Interpol Abuse into annual reports** on the rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and political risk. This will help identify how international notices are used to pressure citizens, entrepreneurs, and political groups.
- **Develop standards for protecting victims of abuse,** including guidelines for national courts, legal practitioners, and human-rights organisations. Special attention should be given to extradition procedures where political context is present.
- **Produce specialised reports on cross-border security abuses,** including cases where Interpol mechanisms are used in clan conflicts, corporate disputes, struggles over assets, and politico-economic persecutions.
- **Establish data-sharing frameworks** between AML/CTF bodies, migration authorities, and Interpol structures to uncover dual and triple-layered pressure schemes (Interpol + AML + sanctions).
- **Promote reform of the RPD,** including clarification of criteria defining “political character” of cases and more explicit evidentiary requirements.

For Academic and Legal Institutions

- **Develop Interpol Abuse case-law databases:** structured archives of CCF decisions, EU and ECtHR rulings, extradition precedents, corporate conflicts, and politically motivated cases. Such databases will enable deeper analysis and modelling.
- **Conduct comparative analysis across countries and regions,** identifying political-economic patterns, types of fabrications, mechanisms of pressure, and links between state policy and international notices.
- **Advance an international academic discipline of “Interpol Studies”** — an interdisciplinary field integrating law, political science, international relations, criminology, sociology, and financial analysis.
- **Strengthen cooperation among research centres, legal communities, and human-rights organisations,** fostering the development of strategic litigation and international protection practices.

— **Develop methodologies for assessing the probability of political motivation** (Political Motivation Probability Index) applicable to specific cases and jurisdictions.

Conclusion

INTERPOL has entered an era in which the classical mechanisms of international law enforcement have ceased to function merely as instruments of criminal cooperation and have instead become components of a far more complex geopolitical architecture. In the context of rising authoritarian tendencies, the consolidation of security elites, the transformation of sanctions regimes, and the globalization of financial control, the system of international notices is increasingly used not for its original purpose but as a tool of pressure, influence, and transnational governance.

Today, INTERPOL effectively operates at the intersection of three systems:

1. international criminal justice,
2. the Sanctions Ecosystem 3.0,
3. financial-regulatory mechanisms, including AML/CTF, KYC, and cross-border asset freezes

This configuration creates fertile ground for abuse by states seeking to employ Red Notices, diffusion requests, extradition procedures, and even the mere *existence* of such measures to achieve political or economic objectives. In several jurisdictions, INTERPOL has become part of strategies to pressure political opposition, a mechanism in corporate conflicts, a tool for the repatriation of capital, and an instrument of control over elites and diasporas.

As a result, INTERPOL's role is undergoing structural transformation: from a neutral platform for international cooperation to a space where the interests of states, intelligence services, corporations, regional alliances, and financial regulators intersect. This shift generates significant institutional risks: overload of the CCF, declining trust from democratic states, a growing number of rejected requests, expanded sanctions-related disclaimers, and reduced effectiveness of legal cooperation mechanisms.

Against this backdrop, ARGA Observatory emphasizes the need for a comprehensive reform of INTERPOL's global architecture — a reform aimed at protecting human rights, strengthening institutional neutrality, raising evidentiary standards, establishing robust monitoring mechanisms, and ensuring real accountability for states that violate the RPD.

INTERPOL remains an essential element of global security. But its future legitimacy will depend on its ability to adapt to a new geopolitical environment, resist political pressure, and uphold the fundamental principles on which the organization was founded.

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