The report examines INTERPOL diffusions and the procedural risks created by the different timing of transmission, compliance review, domestic use and subsequent correction of data. The central issue is not an absence of regulation, but a distributed system of control in which the same material may simultaneously exist at different stages within INTERPOL and national information systems. For that reason, the legality and effectiveness of the mechanism cannot be assessed solely by looking at the final status of a record.

Particular attention is given to wanted-person diffusions. Under the process examined in the report, a request may reach selected National Central Bureaus before the NDTF review has been completed, while recipients are informed that the review remains pending. The report explains why this provisional status should remain visible when the information is subsequently used. Receipt of a message is not equivalent to final approval, but incomplete review does not create a universal prohibition on domestic action where an independent legal basis exists.

The analysis separates three levels of responsibility: the data source, INTERPOL and the CCF, and the State that uses the information for a particular measure. Review within the INTERPOL system does not replace domestic judicial scrutiny, while deletion from INTERPOL does not automatically cancel a national warrant or erase every domestic copy previously created. In practice, this requires separate examination of the communication type, version and review status, the legal basis of the national measure, and the way any later correction was transmitted and implemented.

The report examines five published CCF decisions concerning diffusions. They illustrate different outcomes: deletion because personal involvement was insufficiently particularised, conditional deletion linked to inadequate disclosure safeguards, and retention subject to annotations reflecting subsequent procedural developments. The analysis stresses that the CCF reviews whether data are suitable and sufficiently supported for international police cooperation; it does not replace a criminal court or determine guilt.

ARGA proposes improving traceability throughout the processing chain by preserving a unique identifier and version, review status, the separate basis for urgent domestic action, correction notices and confirmation that those corrections have been processed. The report does not advocate a blanket prohibition on urgent cooperation before every review is complete. Its core objective is instead to ensure that each legally significant step can later be connected to the information used, the competent authority and the legal basis for the action.